|
HOME
NEWS
THE SAA
MEMBERSHIP
CONTACT
INFORMATION
FEATURES
MEMBER GROUPS
LINKS
|
SAA INFO FILE
2003/004
A rebuttal to the paper: “Do fish
have nociceptors: Evidence for the evolution of a vertebrate sensory
system” published in Proceedings of the Royal Society, 2003 by Sneddon,
Braithwaite and Gentle.
By Professor James D. Rose
The paper by Sneddon et al
is deeply flawed and does not provide any legitimate evidence that
trout are capable of feeling pain. There are numerous problems with
methods and interpretation in this paper, but this critique will focus
only on those of greatest significance.
The behavioral studies of
rainbow trout were done by injecting of relatively large volumes of
one of three solutions (bee venom, acetic acid solution or dilute
saltwater) into the jaw of rather small trout. For the sizes of the
fish used, this injection of liquid would have been equivalent to 100
millilitres (more that 3 ounces) of solution into the lip of a human
weighing between 30 and 100 kilograms (66 to 220 pounds). Bee venom
contains a great variety of toxins that affect the nervous system and
cause a hormonal stress response in addition to stimulating
nociceptive receptors signalling tissue injury.
In spite of the massive dose of
venom or acid, the activity level of these fish was not affected, they
did not hide under a shelter in the tank and they resumed feeding in
less than three hours. The acid and venom-injected fish did show a
rocking behavior that is likely to reflect a difficulty of the fish
maintaining an upright posture, given the magnitude of the toxic
chemical trauma created by the injection, rather than an indication of
“pain”.
The most impressive thing about
the result of the acid and venom injections was the relative absence
of behavioral effects, given the
magnitude of the toxic injections. How many humans would show little
change in movement or be ready to eat less than three hours after
getting a lemon-sized bolus of bee venom or acid solution in their
lip? Rather than proving a capacity for pain, these results show a
remarkable resistance to oral trauma.
It comes as no surprise, then,
that many anglers have had the experience of catching the same fish
repeatedly within a span of a few minutes. Of course predatory fishes,
including trout, feed avidly on potentially injurious prey like
crayfish, crabs and fish that have sharp spines in their fins – which
further indicates that these fish are not highly reactive to oral
noxious stimuli.
Another serious issue of
interpretation is that the authors of this paper used an invalid
standard for attempting to identify pain. This paper does not actually
deal with pain (a conscious experience). It deals only with
nociception (unconscious responses to noxious stimuli). I have already
addressed the kinds of conceptual confusions that undermine the paper
by Sneddon et al in my 2002 Reviews in Fisheries Science Paper,
which they did not cite.
The flaws in their argument
include the following:-
|
(1) |
Their definitions of pain
and nociception are invalid and misleading. Pain, as defined by
the International Association for the Study of Pain, is purely a
conscious experience, with a sensory component and a component of
emotional feeling (suffering). In contrast to this conscious
experience of pain, the detection, processing and transmission of
information related to injury by lower, subcortical, levels of the
nervous system is unconscious and defined as nociception - not
pain. According to Sneddon et al any behaviour that is
a reflex would be evidence of nociception, but any behavior more
complex than a reflex would be evidence of pain.
This way of distinguishing
pain from nociception is invalid because there are clearly
complex, non-reflexive behaviors that can be purely nociceptive
and unconscious. For example, humans with extensive damage or
dysfunction of the neocortex in the cerebral hemispheres can still
make a complex of responses including facial displays,
vocalizations, struggling and avoidance reactions to nociceptive
stimuli, but they are unconscious and unable to experience pain.
By the definition of pain used by Sneddon, et al. it would be
concluded that these unconscious humans are feeling pain rather
than making purely nociceptive responses, which is clearly
erroneous.
There are many other
examples of complex, non-reflexive behaviors that can be performed
unconsciously, like the fact that sleepwalkers can open doors,
navigate around obstacles and speak while unconscious during deep
sleep.
|
|
(2)
|
Most
important - in order to show that a fish (or any organism)
experiences pain, it is necessary to show that a fish has
consciousness. Without consciousness, there is no pain.
Nothing presented in this paper necessitates predication of
consciousness for its explanation and the authors don't even deal
with this essential issue. Furthermore, as I have shown in my 2002
Reviews in Fisheries Science paper there is extensive scientific
evidence showing that pain and consciousness depend on very
specific brain regions, namely specialized neocortical regions of
the cerebral hemispheres. These brain regions are absent in fishes
and there are no likely alternative brain systems to perform the
same functions. Consequently, there is no basis for assuming that
a fish might have a capacity for consciousness or pain.
|
The burden of proof that trout
are conscious and potentially capable of feeling pain remains on these
authors and they have ignored this issue by citing previous studies
that also used invalid criteria, such as a capacity for avoidance
learning (which actually occurs unconsciously) for demonstrating pain.
Only anthropomorphic speculation would lead one to conclude that the
trout in this study are experiencing pain.
The evidence that Sneddon et
al present for nociceptive sensory receptors in trout is neither
wholly original nor unexpected. In my 2002 Reviews paper, I cited a
much earlier paper, published by Whitear in 1971, that showed the
presence of C-fibers in bony fishes (e.g. fishes like trout). C-fibers
are a principal type of nociceptive receptor.
The bottom line is that any
attempt to show pain in fish must use valid criteria, including proof
of conscious awareness in fish. This is not something that can be
taken for granted, because on neurological and behavioral grounds it
is so improbable that fish could be conscious and feel pain. We know a
great deal about the neurological requirements for consciousness and
the experience of pain. Extensive, specialized regions of neocortex
are required. Fish lack these brain regions and have no likely
substitute systems for performing the same functions. Furthermore, the
behavioral results of this study show that in spite of very large
injections of acid solution or venom, the fish showed relatively
little adverse effects.
The improbability that fish can
experience pain in no way diminishes our responsibility for concern
about their welfare, because they are still capable of robust
behavioral, physiological and hormonal responses to stressors, which
if sufficiently sustained, can be detrimental to fish health. But,
extensive factual evidence makes it extremely improbable that fish are
capable of experiencing pain or suffering.
Cited reference: Rose, J. D.
2002. The neurobehavioral nature of fishes and the question of
awareness and pain. Reviews in Fisheries Science, 10: 1-38. This paper
can be obtained from the author in electronic form.
James D. Rose, Ph.D.
Department of Zoology and Physiology
University of Wyoming
Laramie, WY 82071
USA
trout@uwyo.edu
2nd May 2003
|